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IS THERE SUFFICIENT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS?
Robert Greg Cavin
A number of Christian philosophers, most recently Gary R. Habermas and
William Lane Craig, have claimed that there is sufficient historical evidence
to establish the resurrection of Jesus conceived as the transformation of
Jesus' corpse into a living supernatural body that possesses such extraordinary dispositional properties as the inability to ever die again. T argue that,
given this conception of resurrection, our only source of potential evidence,
the New Testament Easter traditions, cannot provide adequate information
to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection-even on the
assumption that these traditions are completely historicallv reliable.

A lively debate has taken place over the last several years (often in the
pages of this journal) concerning the possibility of establishing the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus. Although many crucial issues have been
discussed, e.g., the reliability of the New Testament Easter traditions, other
problems, equally important, remain too long overlooked. It is the purpose of this paper to consider one of these neglected problems. I shall
argue, in particular, that because resurrection entails the transformation of
a corpse into a supernatural body, our only source of potential evidence,
viz., the New Testament Easter traditions, do not provide sufficient information to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection-even
on the assumption of their complete historical reliability.
In order to appreciate this problem it is necessary to consider two matters. First, it is necessary to consider what precisely is being claimed as
being established by the New Testament Easter traditions by those who
claim that these are sufficient to establish the historicity of the resurrection
of Jesus. That is, it is necessary to consider what exactly the resurrection is
conceived by these individuals to be and, accordingly, what kind of evidence would be required to establish it. Second, it is necessary to consider
what kind of evidence is actually afforded by the New Testament Easter
traditions and, correlatively, what this evidence is capable of establishing.
I shall discuss these matters in turn.
Let us thus first examine the concept of resurrection supposed by those
who claim that there is sufficient evidence to establish the historicity of the
resurrection of Jesus, most notably, William Lane Craig, Gary R.
Habermas, Murray J. Harris, George Eldon Ladd, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg. 1 According to this concept, resurrection is the transformation
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of a corpse into a living supernatural body (soma pneumatikon)2 and, as
such, is to be sharply distinguished from the resuscitation of a dead individual to the ordinary, premortem state of life (e.g., Lazarus in In. 11:3944).' Typical here is the analysis given by Craig:
Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a
corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated
returns only to this earthly life and will die again. 4
In contrast:
Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can
be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural.
In this new mode of existence he was not bound by the physical
limitations of this universe, but possessed superhuman powers.'
This concept of resurrection, of course, comes directly from the New
Testament where the term 'anastasis' ('resurrection') is reserved exclusively
for that species of revivification affirmed of both Jesus on the third day and
the dead at the end of this age--but never applied to resuscitation. 6 This is
clear from the biblical passages that are constitutive of this concept, e.g.,
the saying ascribed to Jesus in Luke 20:36:
Those accounted worthy to attain ... the resurrection from the dead
... cannot die any more, because they are equal to the angels ...
and the Pauline teaching of 1 Corinthians 15:42-44b:
So is it with the resurrection from the dead.
What is sown is perishable,
what is raised is imperishable.
It is sown in dishonor,
it is raised in glory.
It is sown in weakness,
it is raised in power.
As is evident from these passages, the resurrection body on the concept
we are examining possesses a number of quite extraordinary dispositional
properties. Let us look briefly at those given most prominence by the individuals, noted above, who suppose this concept. It has already been
observed, in the second quotation from Craig, that the resurrection body is
immortal-it is impossible for it to die. Those who are resurrected, for
example, cannot suffocate or be killed by poison, fire, or electrocution.
Beyond mere immortality, however, which is compatible with eternity
spent as, say, a leper or a quadriplegic, the resurrection body possesses the
much stronger property of imperishability; i.e., as Craig, Harris, and Ladd
have observed, it cannot suffer deterioration or deformity or, indeed, any
kind or degree of physical indignity.? This has three important logical consequences. First, it is impossible for the resurrection body to age--it can-
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not wrinkle or loose its firmness or become frail with ever increasing time.'
Second, the resurrection body is insusceptible to all illness and disease, e.g.,
it cannot contract the common cold or AIDS, and thus enjoys absolutely
perfect health. 9 Third, the resurrection body cannot be injured in any way,
e.g., it cannot be blinded by acid or bruised in a fall or cut by a sword or be
otherwise disfigured or maimed.lO In addition to imperishability, finally,
the resurrection body also possesses enormous power-in particular, as
Ladd and Craig have observed, the power to move instantaneously from
place to place, i.e., to vanish and reappear, at will, without regard for spatial distances." Lazarus, of course, once resuscitated, would have to walk
in order to get around; he would be doomed to continue to age, to become
sick or injured on occasion, and to eventually die again. But this is not possible, on the concept we are examining, for one who has undergone resurrection from the dead.
Now, from this brief review of the concept of resurrection held by those
who claim that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection of Jesus, it is clear that the hypothesis of the resurrection is not to be
identified with the comparatively weak claim of revivification:
0)

Jesus died and afterwards he became alive once again.

which is strictly neutral between the hypotheses of Jesus' resurrection and
resuscitation. Rather, the resurrection hypothesis is logically equivalent to
the much bolder claim:
(2)

Jesus died and afterwards he was transformed into a living
supernatural body.

which entails not only 0) but also the following dispositional propositions:
(3)

Jesus became no longer able to die.

(4)

Jesus became no longer able to age.

(5)

Jesus became no longer able to be sick.

(6)

Jesus became no longer able to be injured.

(7)

Jesus became able to move at will instantaneously from place
to place. 12

Correlatively, it is clear that those who claim that the New Testament
Easter traditions are sufficient to establish the resurrection hypothesis are
claiming not merely that there is sufficient evidence to establish (1) but,
quite significantly, that this evidence is sufficient to establish the much
stronger hypothesis (2) and, in consequence, the specific dispositional
propositions it logically implies, viz., (3) through (7). This can be seen once
again in the typical claims they make regarding this matter, e.g., the following claim by Habermas:
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The evidence shows that the claims of the earliest eyewitnesses
have been vindicated-Jesus' literal Resurrection from the dead
in a glorified, spiritual body is the best explanation for the facts."
Now that we have seen how resurrection is conceived by those who
claim that the New Testament Easter traditions are sufficient to establish
the resurrection of Jesus, we can begin to consider what kind of evidence is
required to establish the resurrection hypothesis. Here it is crucial to avoid
the mistake of those who, neglectful of this (the biblical) concept, have been
tempted to suppose that establishing the hypothesis of the resurrection is
merely a matter of establishing the conjunction of two singular historical
propositions, viz.:
(1)

Jesus died and afterwards he became alive once again.

For example, Thomas Sherlock in his classic Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection argues that:
A man rising from the dead is an object of sense, and can give the
same evidence of his being alive, as any other man in the world
can give. So that a resurrection considered only as a fact to be
proved by evidence is a plain case: it requires no greater ability in
the witnesses, than that they be able to distinguish between a man
dead and a man alive; a point in which I believe every man living
thinks himself a judge. 14
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. The problem here is
that Sherlock has confused the relatively weak claim of revivification (1)
with the much bolder resurrection hypothesis:
(2)

Jesus died and afterwards he was transformed into a living
supernatural body.

But now, while (1) may well be established through sense perception by the
kind of two-step procedure envisaged by Sherlock, this is quite impossible
in the case of (2). For (2) logically implies not only (1) but dispositional
propositions (3) through (7)-which alone distinguish it from the hypothesis of Jesus' resuscitation. Accordingly, in order to establish the resurrection
hypothesis it will also be necessary to establish these dispositional propositions. As will now be explained, however, establishing (3) through (7), in
order to establish the hypothesis of the resurrection, requires far more than
merely establishing singular propositions about the past.
Dispositional propositions (3) through (7), of course, are singular propositions, containing the proper name 'Jesus.' However, these propositions
are also, in part, universal generalizations that make very bold claims
about the past, the present, and all times of the future. To see this note that
(3) through (7), as logical consequences of (2), must be understood as elliptical propositions that (within the limitations of our best information) make
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implicit reference to the approximate time of the alleged events they relate,
viz., the period from 30 to 33 CE.IS This is because (2) itself, as understood
by those who hold that there is sufficient evidence to establish the resurrection of Jesus, is not the temporally vague claim that the resurrection
occurred at some time or other in the past, but rather, the comparatively
definite proposition:
(2')

Jesus was transformed into a living supernatural body sometime, after his death, between 30 and 33 CE.

(For example, (2) is clearly understood in the literature, despite its lack of
explicit temporal reference, as being incompatible with a date for the resurrection during the time of Moses or World War II.) Thus, dispositional
propositions (3) through (7), as logical consequences of (2), contain this
implicit temporal reference as well. As a result, however, these propositions also consist, in part, of universal generalizations about the past, the
present, and all times of the future. Consider, for example, dispositional
proposition:
(6)

Jesus became no longer able to be injured.

This asserts that Jesus became no longer able to be injured at some (unspecified) time between 30 and 33 CE. and thus (in part) that immediately
before this time Jesus was not unable to be injured whereas at all times
after this time he has been/will be unable to be injured. Accordingly, (6)
has as a major constituent a universal generalization about the past, the
present, and all times of the future, viz.:
(8)

Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 c.E.

Similarly, dispositional propositions (3) through (5) and (7) have the following universal generalizations as major components as well:
(9)

Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE.

(10) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE.
(11) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE.
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to
place at any time after 33 CE.
These universal generalizations, moreover, make claims of a very strong
kind since they concern the dispositional properties of Jesus' resurrection
body. (8), for example, does not claim that it is a mere matter of happenstance that at each time after 33 C£. nothing injures Jesus. Rather, it
claims that at any such time nothing can injure Jesus-that this is a physiological impossibility. It is clear, then, that very bold universal generalizations are constituents of dispositional propositions (3) through (7) and,
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as such, logical consequences of the resurrection hypothesis (2).
Accordingly, in order to establish (2) it will also be necessary to establish
these universal generalizations.
But now consider what kind of evidence is required to establish universal generalizations (8) through (12). Let us pursue this matter by looking
more generally at any proposition of the form:
(13) Object s is able/unable to cfJat any time after T.
There would seem to be only two possible ways of establishing such a
proposition-depending upon the extent of our previous experience with
objects of the same kind as 5. We will consider each of these and then
apply the results to determine specifically what kind of evidence is
required to establish universal generalizations (8) through (12).
First consider those cases in which s is an object of a kind", of which we
have had considerable previous experience. Here it may be possible, without the need for direct testing, to establish a proposition of the form of (13)
"from above," i.e., by deriving it as a consequence from some previously
well-established general hypothesis of the form that links objects of kind '"
with the permanent ability /inability to cfJ, viz.:
(14) Objects that are'" at a given time are able/unable to cfJ at any
time thereafter.
The evidence we will need to accomplish this is simply the corresponding
proposition of the form:
(15) Object 5 is '" at time

T.

Thus, for example, suppose that a clay pot is fired in a kiln on May 14,
1997. Then we can establish the dispositional proposition:
(16) The clay pot is brittle at any time after May 14, 1997.
without ever actually having to try to crack, fragment, or shatter the pot by
simply appealing to the well-established generalization:
(17) Clay that is fired in a kiln at a given time is brittle at any time
thereafter.
in conjunction with the particular observation-based proposition:
(18) The clay pot was fired in a kiln on May 14, 1995.
Now consider those cases in which s is the kind of object of which we
have had little or no previous experience, so that we lack generalizations
regarding the properties of objects of this kind. Here it will be necessary
to establish a proposition of the form of (13) "from below," i.e., by gathering information about 5 that directly tests it for the ability /inability to cfJ at
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any time after 'T. Suppose, for example, that an old tree stump, found
soaking in a vat of some unknown fluid labeled "E.K.S.," retains this substance, but in solidified form, after its removal from the vat. Then, since,
ex hypothesi, we have no generalizations regarding the behavior of wood
saturated with substance E.K.S., it will be necessary in order to establish
one or the other of the following dispositional hypotheses:
(19) The stump is flammable at any time after its removal from
the vat.
(20) The stump is nonflammable at any time after its removal
from the vat.
to directly test the shImp to see whether it in fact burns. It is crucial, however, not only in this case, but again, in any case generally, that our evidence
concerning object s constitute a genuine test of its ability/inability to cf> at any
time after To Indeed, it is an acknowledged principle of inductive logic that
such a test must provide a considerable number of independent instances
(propositions based ultimately upon observation) acquired over a long period of time in which s does/ does not cf>under a wide variety of circumstances
in which cp-ing occurs. To see this, consider, for example, what kind of evidence would be required to establish proposition (20), whose negative form
makes this requirement particularly acute. It will not do, clearly, even to
have a large number of observations made at various times that merely yield
the information that the stump is not on fire. 16 The problem, of course, is that
this information does not tell us whether the stump has been exposed to conditions that cause combustion on these occasions and, thus, cannot minimize
the probability that it has not-that the stump is actually flammable at these
times. What a genuine test of (20) must do, accordingly, is minimize this
probability by providing evidence in which the stump fails to burn even
though it is exposed to considerable heat (e.g., by being placed in a flame)
while in the presence of oxygen. Moreover, such observations must be made
under a wide variety of circumstances conducive to combustion in order to
minimize the still remaining probability that our evidence (instances in
which the stump is not on fire under conditions that cause combustion) is
due merely to coincidence or some unsuspected transient factor, e.g., an
undetected electric field that, only when present, creates a rearrangement of
the molecules of E.K.S. within the wood fibers that prevents their reaction
with oxygen to produce combustion. Finally, since the stump is being tested
for permanent nonflammability, it is also necessary to gather our items of evidence, not just at a few times that occur fairly close together, but rather, over
a large number of times that are spread far apart. The upshot of this discussion, then, is that in order to establish universal generalizations of the form of
(13) "from below" it will be necessary (and indeed sufficient) to have as evidence a large number of independent instances acquired over a relatively
long period of time in which object s is exposed to a wide variety of conditions that cause cp-ing and yet does/ does not cf>.
In light of this general background we can now see specifically what
kind of evidence is required to establish universal generalizations (8)
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through (2). Consider first what would be required to establish these
propositions "from above." The task here, again, is to avoid the need for
directly testing propositions (8) through (2) by deriving them from some
well-established generalization of the form:
(21) Individuals who are'" at a given time are unable to cP at any
time thereafter.
that links individuals of kind '" with the permanent inability to cP, i.e., to
die, to age, etc. To accomplish this, accordingly, we will need as our evidence the corresponding singular proposition of the form:
(22) Jesus was an individual of kind", sometime between 30 and

33 CE.
For example, it might be possible to use the historical proposition:
(23) Jesus was executed for claiming to be the Son of God and
then revivified in vindication of that claim sometime
between 30 and 33 CE.
in conjunction with the generalization:
(24) Anyone who at a given time is executed for claiming to be
the Son of God and then revivified in vindication of that
claim is unable to be sick at any time thereafter.
to establish:
(1) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE.

We could do this, of course, provided that (23) is among the items of evidence we have at our disposal and that (24) is a well-established general
hypothesis. Propositions (8) through (0) and (2) could be established
"from above" in this same way.
Next consider what would be required to establish universal generalizations (8) through (2) "from below." As is clear from our earlier discussion, here we will need as our evidence a large number of independent
instances gathered over a relatively long period of time in which Jesus is
placed under and passes a wide variety of genuine tests of the dispositional properties posited in these propositions. Thus, for example, consider:
(8)

Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE.

This is a generalization of staggering proportions! It implies such things
as, for example, that Jesus can never be blinded by acid, that he can never
be bruised by stones, that he can never be poisoned by snake venom, that
he can never be pierced by a speeding bullet, that he can never break his
arm falling off the tallest skyscraper, and that he can never be so much as
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even singed by the blast of a hundred-thousand megaton hydrogen bomb!
To establish (8) "from below," accordingly, it will be insufficient to merely
adduce as evidence a proposition like:
(25) Jesus had no injury on a small number of occasions (about a
dozen) that occurred during a brief period of time (forty days)
after his revivification, sometime between 30 and 33 CE.
The problem, of course, is that (25) omits several crucial items information
that are essential for establishing (8), viz., whether the revivified Jesus was
actually subjected to injurious agents at the times to which it refers, what
kinds of agents (if any) these were, what the attending circumstances were
on these occasions, etc. As a result, (25) makes (8) no more probable than it
does obvious competing hypotheses, in particular, that Jesus (like Lazarus)
was merely resuscitated and just happened to avoid injury during the brief
period of time he was observed, that Jesus was able to withstand only certain injurious agents, that Jesus' ability to withstand injury was only temporary (due to some special transient factor), etc. Accordingly, in order to
minimize the probability of these alternatives and thus establish universal
generalization (8) "from below," it will be necessary to have as our evidence the much stronger proposition:
(26) Jesus was subjected to a wide variety of injurious agents
(e.g., the scourge, hydrochloric acid, cyanide capsules, etc.)
under various conditions (e.g., the absence of air, temperatures below -320.5° F) on a large number of independent
occasions between 30 and 1996 CB. and suffered no injury at
any of them.
Propositions (9) through (2) will have to be established "from below" in
essentially the same way. It must be emphasized, however, in the case of:
(0) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE.
that it will be necessary to amass our evidence over a very long period of
time-years if not centuries or even millennia-since this is the only way
to detect signs of the aging process (e.g., increasing wrinkling of skin, graying and loss of hair, advancement of Alzheimer's Disease, rheumatoid
arthritis, etc.) It is also necessary to note in the case of:
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to
place at any time after 33 CE.
that we will need numerous instances in which Jesus specifically wills to
move instantaneously from one place to another and actually succeeds in
doing so.
Let us now turn to the putative historical evidence we actually have for
the resurrection hypothesis. This consists entirely of biblical traditions that
come from the letters of Paul, the Gospels, and the book of Acts. These doc-
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uments report a number of appearances of what is alleged to be Jesus in his
resurrection body: eleven appearances on earth (to Mary Magdalene, Peter,
et al.) during the forty day period that began on the first Easter and one
heavenly appearance (to Paul) approximately three years laterY Let us
grant-but merely for the sake of argument-that the New Testament
Easter traditions are entirely historical, down to the last detaiU 8 Then we
may state these traditions in one compendious proposition as follows:
(27) Jesus died and became alive again sometime between 30 and
33 c.E. On eleven occasions, during the next forty days, he
presented himself alive before various individuals and
groups-doing such things as walking, teaching, eating, etc.
He had no illness or injury (other than what he suffered in
connection with his crucifixion) at any of these times. On
two of them he moved instantaneously from place to place-vanishing from the house in Emmaus and appearing later in
the Upper Room. On another occasion he walked through
the closed doors into the Upper Room. Finally, at the end of
his last appearance, he ascended from the Mount of Olives
into a cloud waiting overhead. Sometime, about three years
later, Jesus appeared on the road to Damascus to Saul of
Tarsus and his traveling companions in the form of a heavenly light and voice/noise claiming to have undergone resurrection from the dead.
Details not explicitly stated in this proposition, e.g., that Jesus appeared to
Mary Magdalene and the other Mary on their way from the empty tomb
(Mt. 28:8-10), are nonetheless tacitly assumed.
Let us now consider, finally, what the New Testament Easter traditions,
as stated in (27), are actually capable of establishing. Taking (27) as our
evidence for the resurrection hypothesis, even for the sake of argument, is
clearly going far beyond "the second mile." After all, (27) even assumes
the revivification hypothesis (1) as a fact(!). Nonetheless, even if we waive
all critical doubt regarding the historical reliability of (27), it is clear that
this "evidence" still cannot be used to establish universal generalizations
(8) through (12)-either "from above" or "from below."
It is clear, first, that we cannot use (27) to establish universal generalizations (8) through (12) "from above." The problem here is that there are no
well-established general hypotheses that link the putative evidence we have
about Jesus in (27) with the dispositional properties of the resurrection
body (e.g., the permanent inability to die) posited in universal generalizations (8) through (12). For example, we have no well-established generalizations about the properties of revivified individuals, e.g.:
(24) Anyone who at a given time is executed for claiming to be
the Son of God and then revivified in vindication of that
claim is unable to be sick at any time thereafter.
because, clearly, we have no experience with revivified persons (especially

EVIDENCE FOR THE RESURRECTTON

371

1

those claiming to be the Son of God) upon which to base such generalizations. It may be objected that we do have eyewitness reports concerning
such individuals, viz., those recorded in the biblical accounts of revivification (2 Kg. 4:32-35; 13:21; Mt. 9:25; 27:52-53; Lk. 7:12-15; In. 11:43-44; Acts
9:36-41; 20:9-10). However, these stories, in addition to being of dubious
historical value, involve only cases of resuscitation. Thus, even if historical,
they would actually tend to support the following generalization:
(28) Anyone who has been revivified at a given time is able to
die, to be injured, etc., at any time thereafter.
and thus, ironically, lead us to the contraries of propositions (8) through
(12)! And this is the situation quite generally: We lack the requisite experience necessary for establishing general hypotheses that would link the
information we have about Jesus with the dispositional properties of the
resurrection body.
It is also clear that we cannot establish propositions (8) through (12)
"from below," by directly testing them against the putative evidence
offered in (27). The problem here, simply, is that the appearances of the
revivified Jesus adduced in (27) do not constitute an adequate sample upon
which to base universal generalizations of such immense scope. This is evident, on the one hand, in the case of the earthly appearances of the revivified Jesus. These are very few (only eleven) in number, occur within a very
brief period of time (only forty days), and, worst of all, do not involve genuine tests of the dispositional properties of the resurrection body. Thus,
Jesus is never exposed to objects that can injure (e.g., a mace), disease producing agents (e.g., Plasmodium malariae), or lethal substances (e.g., mustard
gas), etc. (This is hardly surprising, of course, since his followers would
never dare commit such sacrilege as, e.g., setting Jesus' clothes on fire in
order to see whether he would burn!) Furthermore, Jesus is only observed
during a six week period in these appearances-making detection of the
aging process impossible. Finally, in the Emmaus and first Upper Room
appearances Jesus does not even will (at least overtly) to teleport. Nor, on
the other hand, does the heavenly appearance to Paul on the road to
Damascus add anything appreciable to our evidence. For all that was actually observed on this occasion was a blinding light-not the body of Jesus
itself.'9 Hence, Paul was not in a position to determine whether Jesus could
still be injured, killed, etc. Moreover, there were no further appearances of
the revivified Jesus. 20 Accordingly, we have no observations of the actual
body of Jesus from the time of the ascension until the present. Thus we
have no evidence that Jesus didn't catch a bad cold in 43 CE. or that he didn't cut himself on a rock one hundred years later. We have no evidence that
he didn't succumb to gangrene or a blow to the head in 503 CE. or that he
wasn't shriveled with old age in the year 1200 CE. Nor do we have evidence regarding the ability of Jesus to move instantaneously from place to
place at any of these times. Consequently, the incidents adduced in (27) can
no more establish universal generalizations (8) through (12) than could parallel observations (e.g., made by the townspeople of Bethany) establish:
(29) Lazarus was transformed into a living supernatural body on
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the fourth day after his death by Jesus.
They perhaps offer (12) a scintilla of support-but that is all.
The upshot of this discussion, then, is this. In light of the kind of evidence required to establish universal generalizations either "from above"
or "from below," the putative evidence we actually have from the New
Testament Easter traditions (proposition (27» is far too weak to establish
the distinctive consequences of the resurrection hypothesis:
(8)

Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE.

(9)

Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE.

(10) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE.
(11) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE.
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to
place at any time after 33 CE.
However, since the resurrection hypothesis entails universal generalizations (8) through (12), it is necessary to establish these propositions in order
to establish the resurrection hypothesis. Consequently, it must be concluded that the putative evidence afforded by the New Testament Easter traditions fails to establish the resurrection hypothesis. This conclusion, of
course, applies a fortiori to the bona fide evidence we have for the resurrection hypothesis-what Habermas has called "the known historical facts"
of the case-e.g., the basic empty tomb tradition (Mk. 16:1-6,8) and the
appearance list given by Paul (1 Cor. 15:3-8).21
I think there are two likely objections to my argument that the New
Testament Easter traditions do not provide sufficient evidence to establish
the resurrection hypothesis. First, and most obviously, it may be objected
that the ability of the revivified Jesus (as granted in (27» to appear / disappear and to pass through solid objects signifies a change in the nature of
his body most congruent with the supposition that he could no longer be
injured, die, etc. The intuition here is that a body capable of teleportation
and/ or passage through solid matter must have undergone a remarkable
change incommensurate with all forms of physical corruptibility.
Accordingly, it may be argued that (27) does provide evidence at least for
universal generalizations (8) through (11).
But this objection is without foundation. Upon closer examination, it
proves to be an attempt to establish propositions (8) through (11) "from
above" by appeal to (27) in conjunction with the following implicitly
assumed generalization:
(30) Any revivified person who can move instantaneously from
place to place or pass through solid objects at a given time is
unable thereafter to be injured, to die, to age, or to be sick.
The problem, however, is that this generalization is just an assumption and
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thus incapable of providing the epistemic link required for the relevant
items of (27) to confer evidence upon universal generalizations (8) through
(11). On the one hand, (30) is not true on conceptual grounds, for there are
numerous conceptually possible cases in which it is false, e.g., the case in
which the resuscitated Lazarus is directly teleported by God out of the
tomb. 22 Nor, on the other hand, is there any evidence for (30)-we have
no instances of revivified individuals who can move instantaneously from
place to place or pass through solid objects (other than the very case in
question) and thus have no way of determining what such individuals are
incapable of, e.g., dying, aging, etc. Moreover, there are at least some intuitive grounds for holding that (30) is actually false, since teleportation and
passage through solid objects would surely seem to require the expenditure of tremendous amounts of energy-energy that would no longer be
available for use by a revivified body to maintain itself in homeostasis over
against physico-chemical equilibrium with its environment. 23
Consequently, the appeal to proposition (27) in conjunction with supposition (30), far from providing evidence for universal generalizations (8)
through (11), merely pushes the problem of evidence one step further back.
A second natural objection to my argument that there is insufficient evidence to establish the resurrection hypothesis can be summarized as follows.
The revivified Jesus (as supposed in (27)) was either a liar, himself deceived,
or else telling the truth regarding his resurrection. But, clearly, Jesus wasn't
a liar- we know this already even from his earthly life. Nor could Jesus
have been deceived about the fact of his resurrection. His ascension and
later appearance in heavenly glory preclude this and show that he would
have had to have known what had happened to him, for God would not
allow an individual in such circumstances to be deceived. Consequently, the
revivified Jesus must have been telling the truth about his resurrection, i.e.,
what he actually underwent was resurrection, not resuscitation.
This objection, like the first, is also an attempt to establish propositions
(8) through (12) "from above" by appeal to the relevant items of (27) in
conjunction with certain implicit generalizations-in this case:
(31) Revivified persons who have been great moral teachers are
unable to lie.
(32) Revivified persons who have ascended and appeared in
heavenly glory cannot be deceived regarding their species of
revivification, i.e., whether they have undergone resuscitation or resurrection.
Once again, however, this objection will not withstand scrutiny. The problem here, as before, is that the generalizations presupposed in the objection
are pure speculation and thus cannot furnish the necessary evidential connection between (27) and propositions (8) through (12). It is clear, in the
first place, that neither (31) nor (32) can be shown to be true by appeal to
conceptual considerations. For example, it is conceptually possible that a
very powerful evil spirit (e.g., one of the Watchers of the pseudepigraphic
book of Enoch24 ) or a group of technologically advanced but unscrupulous
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aliens (e.g., the Talosians of Star Trek 25 ) brought about the resuscitation,
ascension, and glorious appearance of Jesus-either forcing him against his
will to lie about the resurrection or else tricking him into believing that it
had actually occurred by enthroning him, after his ascension, in a fake heaven as the "resurrected" Son of Man. This is conceptually possible, note,
even on the Christian conception of God, according to which God is of such
a nature as to permit the occurrence of major theological deception, e.g.,
false signs and wonders capable of misleading even the elecU6 But that this
is at least conceptually possible shows that (31) and (32) cannot be true on
concephlal grounds. 27 Accordingly, if these generalizations are to be shown
to be true at all, it must be by appeal to experience. Unfortunately, however, we have no real empirical evidence for either of these generalizations,
i.e., we have no instances (other than the assumed case in question) of great
revivified moral teachers who have ascended from the earth and then
appeared to others in blinding heavenly glory.28 As a result, we have no
way of determining whether such individuals are peerlessly honest or
pathological liars or whether they are accurately informed or utterly
deceived. There is simply no way to determine the probability of what God
would allow/disallow in such cases. The upshot, accordingly, is that the
claims of the revivified Jesus regarding his resurrection in (27) cannot furnish evidence for universal generalizations (8) through (12).
This brings us to the end of our discussion. We have considered the
claim that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection
hypothesis, viz., the hypothesis that sometime, after his death, between 30
and 33 CE., Jesus was transformed into a living supernatural body permanently incapable of death, aging, etc. Upon careful examination, however,
we have found that our only source of potential evidence, the New
Testament Easter traditions, fall far short of providing the kind of information necessary for establishing the resurrection hypothesis-even on the
assumption of their complete historical reliability (proposition (27)). This
assumption, of course, is rightly dismissed in light of contemporary New
Testament scholarship (particularly in the case of those traditions that
recount the disappearance/ appearance of the revivified Jesus [Lk.
24:31,36], his walking through closed doors Dn. 20:19,26], and his ascension
from the Mount of Olives [Acts 1:91.)29 It has served, nonetheless, to dramatically highlight the ultimate point of this discussion, viz., that the tiny
fraction of New Testament Easter traditions that comprises our bOlla fide
historical evidence-the core empty tomb tradition (Mk. 16:1-6,8) and the
appearance list given by Paul (1 Cor. 15:3-8)-is woefully inadequate to
establish a proposition as bold as the resurrection hypothesis. 3D It also
serves to rebut the charge, so often leveled by apologists, that the reason
critics find evidence wanting for the resurrection is because of overly zealous skepticism toward the New Testament Easter traditions coupled with
the a priori rejection of the supernaturaP For the real problem, we have
seen, is one of logic-not metaphysics. Things would be different, of
course, if had we eyewitness reports of the revivified Jesus passing genuine tests of the dispositional properties of the resurrection body, e.g., the
statement of Peter and John that they saw Roman lances bouncing off the
body of the revivified Jesus as he stormed the Praetorium to unseat Pilate
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and take his rightful place as Messiah. But, unfortunately, we do not.
Consequently, apologists would do well to stop making exalted claims
about establishing the resurrection and turn their attention instead to the
revivification hypothesis. But there are serious logical problems here too
that await future discussion. 32
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1. See William Lane Craig, K1lowing the Truth about the Resurrectioll (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: Servant Books, 1988); idem, Assessilzg the New Testament Evidence
for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus, Studies in the Bible and Early
Christianity, vol. 16 (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1989); Gary R.
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Raised Immortal (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
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Pannenberg, "Did Jesus Really Rise from the Dead?," Dialog 4 (1965): 128-135 and
Jeslls--God and Man, 2nd ed., trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 88-106.
2. Although not entirely satisfactory, the English "supernatural body" is a
much better rendering of the Greek phrase "soma pneumatikon" than the quite misleading expression "spiritual body."
3. This is also the concept of those critical scholars writing on the resurrection
of Jesus who do not necessarily hold that the historical evidence is sufficient to
establish the resurrection hypothesis, e.g., Raymond Brown, Gerald 0' Collins,
Reginald H. Fuller, Pheme Perkins, and J. A. T. Robinson. See, for example,
Raymond Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus (New York:
Paulist Press, 1973), p. 73:
It is probably true that a great number of Christians who believe in the

resurrection of Jesus have confused this resurrection with the resuscitation of a corpse. For instance, many see no difference between the risen
Jesus and the people whom Jesus is reported to have restored to ordinary
life during his ministry (Lazarus, the daughter of Jairus, the son of the
widow of Nain). This is a confusion because the NT evidence is lucidly
clear that Jesus was not restored to ordinary life-his risen existence is
glorious and eschatological, transported beyond the limitations of space
and time; and he will not die again .... Perhaps we could insist on using
"resuscitation" to describe the Gospel miracles by which Jesus restored
men to natural life and on keeping "resurrection" to describe the unique
eschatological event by which Jesus was elevated from the tomb to glory.
4.

Craig, Knowing, p. 15.
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5. Craig, Knowing, p. 127. Cf., for example, the parallel analysis of Harris:
"the term 'resurrection' when it is applied to Christ ... refers to the revival and
metamorphosis of Jesus of Nazareth after his crucifixion and burial" (p. 58); "the
Resurrection was not a resuscitation of the earthly Jesus merely to renewed physical life" (p. 56); and "the resurrection of Christ was unlike the 'raisings' mentioned
in the gospels (Mark 5.22-4,35-43; Luke 7.11-17; Jo1m 4.46-53; 11.1-44) in that Jesus
... rose in a glorified deathless state (Rom. 6:9)" (p. 57).
6. See the discussion of this point in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible,
s.v. "Resurrection," by J. A. T. Robinson. Note that throughout this article I am
using the term 'revivification' in just that sense according to which all resuscitations and all resurrections are revivifications--but not vice versa. It is worth noting in this connection that at least for Paul the verb 'egeiro' also applies only to
revivification as transformation into a supernatural body. Thus Paul (Rom. 6:9)
gives as the sole grounds of our knowledge that Jesus will never die again the
reason that Jesus has been raised from the dead.
7. Craig, Assessing, p. 142; idem, Knowing, p. 141; Harris, p. 121; Ladd, p. 115.
Consider, for example, the observations made by Craig (Knowing, p. 104): "The
resurrection body ... is completely freed from the effects of sin ... such as disease,
death, and decay ... " and by Ladd (p. 114):
The mortal body is perishable, dishonouring and weak; the resurrection
body [is] ... imperishable, glorious, and powerful ... Who can imagine
a body without weakness? or infection? or tiredness? or sickness? or
death? This is a body utterly unknown to earthly, historical existence.
8. Craig, Knowing, p. 141; Harris, p. 121. Harris points out (p. 121) that the
resurrection body is forever freed from the distressing infirmity of old age and
observes in this connection (p. 123) that:
Compared with the earthly and therefore transient character of the
physical body, the spiritual [resurrection] body is permanently durable,
transcending all the effects of time. Compared with earthly corporeality with its irreversible tendency to decay which finally issues in death,
the heavenly embodiment is indestructible, incapable of deterioration or
dissolution.
9. Craig, Knowing, p. 141; Harris, p. 121; Ladd, p. 115.
10. Craig, Knowillg, p. 141; idem, Assessing, p. 142; Harris, p. 121.
11. On this point Craig states: "According to the gospels, Jesus in his resurrectio. b, iy had the ability to appear and vanish at will, without regard to spatial distances." (Assessing, pp. 342-43); and: "In his resurrection body Jesus can
materialize and dematerialize in and out of the physical universe" (Assessing, p.
346).
12. I am using the modal terms 'able' and 'unable' in connection with the
phrases 'to die,' 'to age,' 'to be sick,' and 'to be injured' in just that sense according to which a thing is able/unable to die, age, be sick, or be injured only if it is
alive. There is, of course, a trivial sense in which a corpse can be said to be
unable to die, age, and be sick-simply because it is not a living thing. This is
the sense in which any inanimate object, e.g., a rock, is unable to die, age, and be
sick. Similarly, there is also a sense in which a corpse might be said to be able to
be injured--because it can still be cut up, burned, etc. But neither of these
accords with the above sense which is understood throughout this discussion.
13. Habermas and Flew, p. 29. Cf., for example, the claims made by Craig
(Knowing, p. 127):
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The historical evidence supports the resurrection of Jesus. The empty
tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith
can be explained only if Jesus actually rose from the dead. What are
some implications of this fact? ... First, the resurrection of Jesus was an
act of God. Jesus' resurrection was not just a resuscitation of the mortal
body to this earthly life, as with Lazarus, miraculous as that would be.
Rather, Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that
can be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. In
this new mode of existence, he was not bound by the physical limitations of this universe, but possessed superhuman powers.
by Harris (p. 71):
There are compelling historical evidences that encourage and validate
the belief that, at the latest, some thirty-six hours after his death and
burial, Jesus rose from the dead in a transformed bodily state.
and by Ladd (p. 140):
The only hypothesis which adequately explains the "historical" facts,
including the empty tomb, is that God actually raised the body of Jesus
from the realm of mortality in the world of space and time to the invisible world of God ...
14. Thomas Sherlock, The TryaZ of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus, 8th
ed. (London: 1736), p. 63.
15. Given our best current information, the terminus a quo and terminus ad
quem of the resurrection are respectively April 9, 30 C.E. and April 5, 33 C.E.
16. That is, not on fire at these times.
17. This figure of eleven depends on how one tries to harmonize the various
appearance traditions. But it makes no difference exactly how many appearances there were.
18. In actual practice we cannot assume the complete detailed historical
accuracy of the New Testament Easter traditions since several of the components
that make up these traditions contradict one another. I am simply pretmding
here that we can completely harmonize these traditions.
19. As Craig points out (Assessing, p. 75 n. 35 and p. 333), all Paul actually
saw on the road to Damascus was a light brighter than the sun.
20. What Stephen (Acts 7:55-56) and John of Patmos (Rev. 1:12-16) saw were
mere visions--not genuine appearances of the revivified Jesus.
21. Habermas and Flew, pp. 25-26. Habermas lists "four core historical
facts" as "accepted as knowable history by virtually all scholars" and a larger set
of twelve facts as "accepted as knowable history by many scholars." Proposition
(27), of course, includes both sets.
22. By conceptually possible here I mean (roughly) logically consistent with
the definitions of our concepts.
23. One might well think that the diversion of energy necessary for teleportation or passage through solid objects would increase the aging process as well
as susceptibility to injury, disease, and dying.
24. The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, S.V. "Watcher," by Theodor H.
Gaster.
25. The Star Trek Encyclopedia, S.v. "The Cage" and "Talosians."
26. Thus according to the Christian conception of God:
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False Christs and false prophets will arise and show great signs and
wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect. (Mt. 24:24)
and:
The coming of the lawless one by the activity of Satan will be with all
power and with pretended signs and wonders, and with all wicked
deception for those who are to perish, because they refused to love the
truth and so be saved. Therefore God sends upon them a strong delusion, to make them believe what is false, so that all may be condemned
who did not believe the truth but had pleasure in unrighteousness. (2
Th.2:9-12)
On this conception, all of the billions of adherents of all of the world's religions
(other than Christianity) are being deceived to the point of eternal damnation-by God's permission. Moreover, on the Christian conception God actually
allows people to have llnvcridical experiences of being transported into "heaven"
and being told things by "angels" which, unbeknownst to them, are diametrically opposed to the truth. Consider, for example, the Kabbalah mystic's experience of the Merkabah in the Seventh Hall of the Seventh Heaven and the neardeath out-of-body experiences of the New Age movement wherein "revelations"
are imparted that run contrary to the message of the gospel.
27. It might seem plausible to hold that the proposition that Jesus ascended
into heaven and sat down at the right hand of God entails universal generalizations (8) through (12) by virtue of conceptual considerations. Note, however,
that our "evidence" statement (27) doesn't assert this. Although more than generous, (27) says only that Jesus ascended from the Mount of Olives into a cloud
waiting overhead (Acts 1:9) and that he appeared to Paul on the road to
Damascus in the form of a glorious heavenly light (Acts 9:3).
28. Nelson Pike has kindly pointed out to me in this connection that from
the standpoint of traditional Christian theology there can be in principle no
empirical evidence for (31) or (32) (or for (24) above), other than the assumed
case in question, because according to this view these propositions apply
uniquely to Jesus.
29. For excellent discussions of the critical problems concerning to the New
Testament Easter traditions see Reginald H. Fuller, The Formation of the
Resurrection Narratives (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) and Craig, Assessing,
Parts I and II.
30. Note that even if it is denied that universal generalizations (8) and (10)
through (12) are consequences of the resurrection hypothesis (2), this cannot be
denied regarding (9), since every use of the term "resurrection" in the New
Testament-from the resurrection of Jesus to the resurrections of the just and of
the unjust at the end of time--involves the permanent inability to die. But, as
was shown in the main text above, proposition (27) provides no evidence for
universal generalization (9). Thus, since (2) entails (9), it still cannot be denied
that there is not sufficient evidence to establish (2).
31. Craig, for example, (Knowing, p. 126) echoes the charge of Carl Braaten:
Theologians who deny the resurrection have not done so on historical
grounds; rather theology has been derouted by existentialism and historicism, which have a stranglehold on the formation of theological statements. This makes denials of Jesus' historical resurrection all the more
irresponsible, because this conclusion has not been determined by the
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facts--which support the historicity of the resurrection--but by philosophical assumptions.
Cf. the parallel charges made in Cary R. Habermas, "Knowing that Jesus'
Resurrection Occurred: A Response to Stephen Davis," Faith and Philosophy 2
(July 1985): 298-299; Harris, pp. 65-67; Ladd, pp. 12-13,23-27; Pannenberg, "Did
Jesus Really Rise?," p. 131.
32. It is my intention to discuss these problems in a future article to be entitled "A Logical Analysis and Critique of the Historical Argument for the
Revivification of Jesus."

